maintain and modernize the most advanced and secure nuclear arsenal in the world. 4 A key aspect of the general position held by supporters of the nuclear arsenal includes retaining the triad and replacing aging platforms.
In the ongoing debate over the appropriate size and purpose of the nuclear arsenal, abolitionists-clearly in the ascendency-make six basic arguments that would ultimately lead to creation of a nuclear monad before reaching total disarmament: 5
1. Post-Cold War presidents have failed to alter nuclear policy for the current security environment.
Terrorism, not Russia, is the primary threat facing the United
States. Nuclear weapons do not deter terrorists.
3. America's advanced conventional capabilities can accomplish the same objectives as nuclear weapons.
4. As a signer of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United
States must move toward nuclear abolition.
5. Only nuclear disarmament can overcome the threats of accidental detonation, miscalculation leading to nuclear war, and proliferation of nuclear weapons and material.
6. The safest and most secure leg of the nuclear triad is the seabased one. Thus, it should become the sole delivery platform for the nuclear arsenal. 6 Admittedly, each of these arguments has some element of truth; they do not, however, represent a complete understanding of the strategic role played by nuclear weapons in ensuring the sovereignty of the United States or the specific contribution of each leg of the triad.
Although each of the abolitionists' arguments deserves a detailed refutation, a focus on the relevance of the triad must suffice.
Development of the Triad
In 1947, the year the United States Air Force became an independent service, the American military was attempting to develop sound tactical, operational, and strategic doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons. Just two years earlier, a new and devastating weapon had changed the face of warfare, but the full implications of the atom bomb were yet to be realized. In a flurry of activity, the academic, military, and policy communities undertook much writing and studying as the nation sought to understand nuclear weapons while also confronting the Soviet Union. As technology developed over the following decades, the nation moved from depending on a fleet of long-range bombers as the sole method of delivering nuclear weapons (1945-59) to a nuclear triad composed of bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and SLBMs. 7 During the 1950s, Pres. Dwight Eisenhower believed that an American effort to maintain conventional parity with the Soviet Union would destroy the US economy and bankrupt the federal treasury. 8 Thus,
his administration turned to the nuclear arsenal as a substitute for conventional parity. In the president's view, the United States could effectively deter Soviet aggression by placing greater emphasis on nuclear weapons in American national security policy. Commonly called the "New
Look," the president's emphasis on the growth of advanced nuclear weapons and delivery platforms led to development of a large fleet of nuclear bombers and, by the end of the Eisenhower administration, the nuclear triad. 9 Composed of three legs, the triad provides the United
States with three distinct delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.
The first and oldest leg includes the nation's long-range bombers and their payload of gravity bombs and air launched cruise missiles. At its apex in the early to mid-1960s, Strategic Air Command included more than 1,300 nuclear-capable bombers, including 700 of the then-new B52s. 10 By 1990 the nation's long-range bomber fleet had declined to 347 total aircraft. 11 Today, nuclear-capable bombers account for about half of would not roll through the Fulda Gap on their way to Paris. 17 Extended deterrence, as it came to be known, enabled Western Europe to focus on economic development instead of heavy investment in national security.
Although this type of deterrence often proved unpopular with European publics, governments throughout Western Europe depended upon the security provided by basing nuclear weapons throughout the West.
Entering the Post-Cold War Era
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, assured destruction and related nuclear strategies that had served the nation well for more than two generations were almost forgotten as the euphoria that engrossed America took hold. 18 With it, the triad fell into decline. As the former Soviet Union sought to stabilize its deteriorating economy by lowering its military expenditures, the United States joined Russia in making dramatic reductions to the overall size of the nuclear arsenal.
The "peace dividend" promised to the American people by presidents States at risk by reducing the nuclear arsenal to a point that nuclear deterrence loses the credibility that enables its success.
The Current Debate
In an era dominated by nonstate actors (terrorists, international criminal gangs, and insurgents), rogue regimes, and rising powers, some members of the Air Force are asking whether the triad is still relevant or whether nuclear abolitionists are correct in suggesting that the United
States adopt a monad as the nation moves toward zero. The answers to these questions deserve considerable attention. In short, however, the triad is as relevant today as it was at the height of the Cold War.
Nevertheless, before offering a justification for maintaining the triad, one
should explain the position of nuclear abolitionists.
The Abolitionists' Position
According to the most recent reports and studies published by advocates of nuclear abolition, the United States should initiate complete disarmament by taking the following actions. 23 First, abolitionists desire to remove the 76 remaining B-52H and 19 B-2 bombers from nuclearcapable service. 24 By maintaining an arsenal of 500-1,000 warheads, as abolitionists suggest, the United States no longer needs the bomber leg of the triad. Additionally, the nation's long-range bombers are slow to reach their targets, cannot penetrate advanced antiair defenses (with the exception of the B-2), and are expensive to procure and maintain.
Second, abolitionists seek to dismantle the nation's 450 ICBMs, which need expensive upgrades or replacement and present the nation's adversaries a target on American soil.
Third, abolitionists are willing to accept, for the near term, a nuclear deterrence strategy that relies solely on a dozen Ohio-class SSBNs, each armed with 24 Trident II SLBMs. 25 According to their strategy, the United States will maintain half of its SSBNs at sea at any given time while the other half is in port at one of two designated submarine bases.
Abolitionists are willing to accept a submarine-based monad because they consider submarines the most secure leg of the triad. These vessels also obviate the need for operationally deployed nuclear weapons on US soil. Supposedly, the absence of these weapons would reduce the likelihood of a counterforce strike against the homeland.
Because these arguments seem reasonable and each contains an element of truth, they have wide appeal. But if the United States were to adopt a monad, the nation's ability to deter current and future adversaries would decline precipitously for four key reasons.
The Counterview
First, deterrence, the capstone of American foreign policy since the end of World War II, relies on effectively making an adversary believe that the risks involved in changing the status quo outweigh any potential rewards. To achieve effective deterrence, the United States must have the capability and, most importantly, credibility to create the desired psychological effect. Moving to a nuclear deterrence strategy that effectively depends on a half dozen deployed submarines undermines both capability and credibility. Contrary to the admonitions of abolitionists, adopting a monad sends a clear signal to America's adversaries that the nation does not value nuclear weapons to the degree it once did and will be more reluctant to use a diminished arsenal in the future. This emboldens adversaries and decreases the confidence that US allies have in the nation's extended deterrence.
Successful deterrence depends completely upon simply and effectively communicating desire and intent to allies and adversaries. capabilities that may enable either nation to detect, track, and sink the half of the nuclear arsenal (six submarines) at sea. 27 Moving to a submarine-based monad will also encourage adversaries of the United
States to focus technological development on advanced sonar and torpedo technology. Doing so will simplify the calculation for an adversary seeking to neutralize the American arsenal.
The United States may soon face a real scenario in which two nuclear missiles and a half dozen torpedoes can destroy the entire operationally deployed strategic nuclear arsenal-something no American should desire. Redundancy, which the triad provides, offers a level of protection that a submarine-based nuclear arsenal would greatly diminish.
Increasing American vulnerability and decreasing American capability do not represent a strategy for successful deterrence. As history demonstrates, deterrence works when the United States effectively convinces its adversaries that an attack on America will fail to carry out the desired objectives and will invoke massive retaliation. Any other approach to deterrence is doomed to failure.
Relying on what abolitionists refer to as "minimum deterrence" is a recipe for placing the American people at greater risk, not less. 28 Even though the United States will likely suffer a terrorist attack, it is certainly not the most dangerous threat the nation faces. With the nuclear club expanding and likely to gain new members hostile to the United States, weakening the nuclear triad is unwise. Doing so not only will undermine American credibility but also will cause allies to doubt America's commitment to extended deterrence. This could lead allies to pursue their own nuclear arsenals as a hedge against American weakness and
perceived threats yet to materialize.
Even though we Americans are generous, well-intentioned people, others do not necessarily wish us well. We would be wise to remember
